

Inter-Group Contacts and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments at the Dawn of the 2015

Migration Crisis: The Case of Hungary

Working Paper, 2018

By Bori Simonovits

Contact: simonovits.borbala@ppk.elte.hu

ELTE Eötvös Lóránd University Budapest, Faculty of Education and Psychology

Hungary, Budapest, 1075 Budapest, Kazinczy u. 23–27.

Abstract

Even though in Hungary, as in most Eastern European countries, the proportion of the migrant population is relatively low, anti-immigrant sentiments have been measured to be very high compared to those in Western European and Nordic countries. My primary aim is to analyse how intergroup contacts and other socio-demographic predictors work in forming anti-immigrant views in a country, i.e. in Hungary, where the proportion of the migrant community is less than 2 per cent of the population. This topic is highly relevant in light of the recent migration crisis in Europe as well as terrorist attacks and other incidents in which Muslim immigrants (mostly in the name of the Islamic State) played a significant role worldwide. Based on logistic regression analysis of the latest data from the European Social Survey, my results reinforced Allport's Intergroup Contact Hypothesis. The positive relationship between having close friends and/or regular contact with different racial or ethnic groups and pro-immigrant attitudes towards Muslim, Jewish, and Roma people is obvious to see in our multivariate analysis. Beyond having intergroup contacts, higher levels of education and left-wing political orientation both had a strong positive correlation with pro-immigrant views related to all three immigrant groups.

Key words, Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, Islamophobia, Intergroup contact, Hungary

Introduction

In recent decades, in most European countries immigration has become an increasingly salient social and political issue. Moreover, the migration crisis of recent years has been increasingly effecting Europe, raising further policy questions and security dilemmas related to the integration of third country national migrants and refugees. Therefore, the different aspects of intergroup relations, anti-immigrant sentiments —and primarily Anti-Muslim sentiments— have become a major research area in the social sciences. Focusing on the Hungarian context, irregular migration—with a special focus on Muslim immigrants—has become a salient political issue most recently, as due to its geographic location Hungary is one of the main transit countries of irregular land migration towards other European Union Member States (IOM, 2018)

One of the main goals of the present paper is to analyse the social basis of high levels of anti-immigrant sentiments in Hungary. The initial question is why anti-immigrant sentiments are so strong in a country where the issue of migration had not been significant at all until the recent migration crisis, which started in 2015. In the introductory part of this paper I will provide a basic overview of the most relevant (i) *demographic country features*, as well as the (ii) *political and the social context*.

After the contextual overview (Section 1) a literature review will be presented on the most significant empirical work on our subject matter (Section 2). In Section 3 I will present the data and my empirical strategy. Then I will present the results of my data analysis, and discuss my main findings (Section 4); this will be followed by a brief section highlighting the study's limitations, and concluding remarks (Section 5).

1. Contextual background

The case of Hungary is special among the EU10 countries for the following reasons. Besides Serbia, Hungary was the only country in the Central Eastern European region that directly experienced the migration crisis during 2015 and 2016 simply because of the Schengen border between Serbia and Hungary. In the summer of 2015, hundreds of thousands of mostly Muslim migrants crossed the Serbian-Hungarian border heading towards Western and Northern European countries. In reaction the Hungarian government built a razor-wire fence at the southern border of Hungary in order to stop the huge and unprecedented migration flow.

1.1. Demographic country features

Discussing Hungary's demographic profile in a nutshell, we have to emphasise the following two main features: (i) Hungary is a relatively homogenous country both in terms race and ethnicity—the largest ethnic minority is the Roma, consisting of 5-6 percent of the total population (Kemény and Janky 2006)—as well as in terms of religion: the overwhelming majority is Christian, mostly Catholic; (ii) the proportion of the migrant population is low; the number of immigrants per 1000 inhabitants remain well below those in all Western European countries.

The crude immigration rate—the number of immigrants related to the size of the population in the destination country—has been fluctuating between 1.8 and 2.6 per thousand since 2000, whereas in the majority of Western European countries this rate is over 5 or in some cases even 10 per thousand (Gödri 2015). In terms of religious minorities, the Jewish community constitutes the most significant community, making up approximately 1 percent of the total population (Kovács 2011), mostly concentrated into Budapest. However, it is worth mentioning that most members of the Jewish community do not consider themselves as a religious minority, but as people sharing a collective identity e.g. due to the common trauma of the Holocaust.

Hungary had not had much previous experience with migration when in the early 1990s asylum seekers fleeing from the Balkan wars arrived in larger numbers (ca. 37 thousand immigrants in 1990). The numbers after that fluctuated at a lower level (between 13-16 thousand per year) until the turn of millennium, when it again reached 20 thousand people per year. As Hungary's population is slightly below 10 million, the increased social needs of the different migration flows have never presented a huge burden for the country. This is especially so, because in many cases Hungary functions as a *transit country* (IOM, 2018), i.e. most of the irregular immigrants do not intend to stay in Hungary but continue on their way to more prosperous Western and Northern European countries, primarily to Germany and Sweden.

1.2 The political and social context

In general terms, Hungarian society can be described as a closed society, i.e. with low levels of institutional and personal trust, a very weak civil sphere, a lack of solidarity and an unwelcoming attitude towards strangers and outliers (Bernát, Kertész, and Tóth 2016).

As far as social trust is concerned, the concordant result of representative surveys (most importantly based on the fourth and fifth waves of the World Value Surveys) is that Hungarian society can be described as a society with low levels of trust (both at the institutional and personal levels) among the European countries and with high levels of perceived unfairness (Keller 2009 and 2013). In line with that, altruistic attitudes are relatively low in Hungary compared to other European countries (Giczi and Sik 2009).


As far as the political sphere is concerned, migration had been considered a marginal issue in Hungary up until 2002, when the Hungarian Socialist party envisioned “23 million Romanian jobseekers (as a negative consequence of a proposed new legislation, called Status Law), and then in 2004 the same party, at that time in government, campaigned against foreign guest labourers “invading” Hungary as the result of the dual citizenship referendum proposed by the political opposition. (The referendum failed due to low voter turnout). The issue of mass migration has once again become the primary topic for the Hungarian Government since the migration crisis of 2015 (Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut 2015).

Further discussing the political context, it is important to mention that throughout the year of 2017 the Hungarian government ran a billboard campaign against George Soros’s pro-immigration stances, as a follow up of the anti-immigrant billboard campaign introduced in the spring of 2015. The campaign—featuring Soros’s smiling face with the words “Don’t let Soros have the last laugh”—resulted in sporadic incidents of anti-Semitic graffiti throughout the country. Then one of the major issues in the campaign for Hungary’s 2018 parliamentary election dominated by the governing party was the possible dangers of the mass-migration affecting Europe, which commentators interpreted as one of the major reasons for the re-election of Hungary’s right-wing FIDESZ party with a super majority.

Well-known scholars (Róna-Tas 2016; Erős 2016) have used the term *moral panic* to describe the recent developments of the Hungarian public discourse, relying on the above mentioned channels and campaign elements. Both Erős and Róna-Tas argued that a moral panic was stoked by the Hungarian government, relying on strong national feelings, xenophobic attitudes closely related to welfare chauvinism, and scapegoating.

Welfare chauvinism refers to the idea that welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the natives of a country, as opposed to sharing them with immigrants. The idea that "welfare services should be restricted to our own" has had a great impact on public opinion and on asylum policy as well (for earlier research on that in the Hungarian context see for example Enyedi, Fábíán and Sik, 2004). Based on our recent research, migration-related fear and scapegoating was found to be at very high levels in Hungary, as well as in countries neighbouring Hungary, despite the low proportions of migrants in these countries compared to those in Western Europe (Simonovits et al. 2016).

According to a recent survey on xenophobic attitudes—carried out by TÁRKI—in January 2017, the level of xenophobia had reached an all-time high (60% of the total population), and xenophilia had practically disappeared in Hungary since the recent migration crisis affected Hungary (Fig 1).



Why is it that even though in Hungary the proportion of the migrant population is relatively low, anti-immigrant sentiments are measured to be very high compared to those in Western European and Nordic countries? Understanding the reasons for this apparent contradiction is the main focus of my paper. My more specific aim is to measure the correlation between individuals' inter-ethnic contacts and anti-immigrant views. Asking specific questions about potential Muslim, Jewish, and Roma immigrants enables us to compare the effects of inter-ethnic contacts on the level of refusal or acceptance of the three different migrant groups. Beyond the different aspects of inter-ethnic contact, other (socio-demographic and attitudinal) predictors are also included in our multivariate models to explore the social basis of pro- and anti-immigrant sentiments.

2. Literature Review

There is a growing body of literature analysing the social-demographic determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes. In this section I review the most relevant empiric research focusing on the working mechanisms of intergroup contacts related to prejudices, as well as on research explaining the social-demographic predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments. Regarding intergroup contacts, my analytical framework is primarily based on Intergroup Contact Theory, originally developed by Gordon W. Allport (1954). The basic idea of Allport's theory—also known as Contact Hypothesis—is that under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways of reducing prejudice between majority and minority group members.

While Intergroup Contact Theory originally held that Allport's optimal conditions are essential in order to reduce intergroup prejudices effectively, a comprehensive review of more than 500 empirical studies examining Contact Hypothesis (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) helped refine the original theory, drawing attention to other important elements of the working mechanisms of intergroup contacts. In their meta-analysis, the authors highlighted that intergroup contact has a positive effect on negative stereotyping, and scholars have drawn attention to the effect that the *quantity of intergroup contacts* has on reducing prejudices, as frequency of contact helps the decategorization of out-group members, and diminishes stereotypical ways of thinking (see also Velasco—Gonzalez et al. 2008). Pettigrew and Tropp concluded that 94% of the more than 500 studies reviewed—including surveys, and different types of experiments— had found that intergroup contact significantly reduces prejudices.

Furthermore, there is a rapidly growing body of literature supporting the hypothesis that intergroup contact can reduce perceived threat and anxiety about future interactions with members of the outgroup (Stephan and Stephan 1985; Islam and Hewstone 1993; Blair et al. 2003), which is highly relevant in relation to attitudes towards immigrants; as many studies have pointed out, perceived threat (both at the symbolic and realistic level) is a key element of anti immigrant feelings (for international results see: Stephan et al. 2002 and Paolini et al. for Hungary see Simonovits 2016).

Rustenbach (2010) tested the effect of intergroup contacts on anti-immigrant attitudes, completed with the following seven different explanatory theories and predictors: cultural marginalisation theory, human capital theory, political affiliations, societal integration,

perceived neighbourhood safety, foreign investment, and economic competition. Examining all together eight factors in one model has the advantage of making it possible to compare the strength of the different explanatory variables, and identify which variable has the weakest and the strongest effect on anti-immigrant attitudes. Multilevel data analysis—based on ESS6 data from 2002-2003 and 2004-2005 completed with EUROSTAT data for contextual variables—fully supported four out of the eight hypotheses, and partly supported two others. In line with previous empiric research results (Gang et al. 2002), higher education was related to more pro-immigrant attitudes, supporting human capital theory. Having a left-leaning political orientation, being interested in politics, and being a resident of a left-leaning nation (contextual variable derived from Eurostat data) also increases the likelihood of being pro-immigrant, which together supports explanations by political affiliation. Furthermore, positive association between attitudes towards immigrants and neighbourhood safety as well as higher levels of foreign direct investment (contextual variable derived from Eurostat data) were also supported. Explanations connected to societal integration and economic competition were partly supported. Somewhat surprisingly, explanations on contact theory—measured by the regional number of immigrants and the national number of immigrants—were not supported by the data analysis, which might be due to the measurement tool.

In my view, based on previous theoretical and empirical research, intergroup contact should be measured at the individual level, rather than regional or national, in order to gain a clearer insight into the mechanisms working in the background. I base my empirical analysis on the 7th wave of ESS consists of more appropriate questions for measuring intergroup contact related to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of it.

Analysing the most recent publicly available cross-national results of European Social Survey—wave 7, which fieldwork was carried out during 2014 and 2015—on anti-immigrant sentiments, Messing and Ságvári (2018) concluded that different components of *fear (welfare, labour market, crime, cultural and religious)* are the most important basis of anti-immigrant views and the following five factors correlated the most strongly with less negative attitudes towards mass-migration in all examined countries at the individual level: high level of interpersonal and institutional trust, tertiary education, contact with different racial or ethnic groups and feeling safe at dark. Beyond the micro-level factors, the authors concluded that the following macro-level factors explained the most the differences in the attitudes towards migration: “people in countries with a large migrant population, with a high level of general and institutional trust, low level of corruption, a stable, well performing economy and high level of social cohesion and inclusion (including migrants) fear migration the least according to the

data from 2014-15.” (p. 28.)

Focusing on the Hungarian surveys on anti-immigrant sentiments, previous research suggests that generally xenophobic attitudes are strongly correlated with social status and personal contact with immigrants—respondents who are excluded from the labour market, have lower levels of education, and are in a bad financial situation, as well as those who do not know any immigrants personally, tend to demonstrate greater levels of anti-immigrant sentiments (Dencső and Sik 2007). Political activity and party preferences are also considered to be important predictors of xenophobic attitudes: Jobbik voters and politically inactive respondents (i.e. those not planning to participate in the next parliamentary election) tend to be more xenophobic than left-wing party supporters (Simonovits and Szalai 2013). However, multivariate models also revealed that among the socio-demographic predictors (i.e. gender, age, place of residence, and education level) only achievement of a high level of education significantly decreased overtly xenophobic attitudes. Furthermore, multivariate models that examined a vast Hungarian database from 2011 (N=3000) also underlined the fact that personal contact (with different racial and ethnic groups) and anti-immigrant sentiments (measured through perceived social distance) are positively correlated (Simonovits and Szalai 2012).

Freshly published research findings, based on the 7th wave of ESS, about anti-immigrant attitudes reinforce the fact that levels of education and subjectively-perceived financial status correlate negatively, while age correlates positively with dismissive attitudes towards immigrants. Party preference is also an important factor in anti-immigrant attitudes: being a Jobbik supporter significantly increases the likelihood of having a dismissive attitude towards immigrants (Messing and Ságvári 2016).

Most recently Kende, Tropp and Lantos (2016) tested the effects of intergroup friendship between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians on attitudes, relying on a quasi-experimental research design of a small sample (N=61). Comparing pre- and post-test measures of the experimental and the control group, the researchers observed significant positive changes in attitudes and intentions in creating contact exclusively among participants devoted to the contact condition in the experiment. Kende and her colleagues also concluded that positive changes were moderated by perceived institutional norms, which might corroborate the potential of contact-based interventions. In contrast to Kende and her colleagues’ intervention—which was implemented in a university setting—the representative survey I am analyzing in this study, was carried out in an extremely xenophobic public atmosphere, in which the government repeatedly emphasised the possible negative consequences of mass-

immigration into Hungary and Europe accompanied by widespread xenophobic rhetoric directed against refugees, Brussels, and most recently against George Soros (see more on that in Simonovits 2016 and Simonovits forthcoming).

Summing up the already existing literature about Hungary, we may conclude that the Hungarian society is a rather homogenous, highly unequal society, with low levels of trust. Regarding attitudes towards minorities, based on Kende, Tropp and Lantos (2016) positive intergroup contacts are atypical and based on Enyedi, Fábíán and Sik (2004) the level of anti-Roma prejudice has been identified and most openly expressed form of intergroup hatred. In the next section I will show how intergroup contacts, completed with further predictors, explain anti-immigrant sentiments.

3. Materials and Methods: Empirical Strategy

As an empirical foundation, I am using the 7th wave of the European Social Survey (hereafter referred to as ESS7 data) containing a special section on attitudes towards immigrants (in relation to potential Jewish, Muslim, and Roma immigrants entering the country) as well as a section on social contact (measuring both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of it) with people of a different racial or ethnic background. The fieldwork was carried out in late spring of 2015 in Hungary.

Multivariate models to test the central hypothesis

Based on the above-mentioned literature review and research evidence, we formulated the following four hypotheses for our research. Our central hypothesis is that appropriate intergroup contact (as defined by Allport, 1954 and extended by Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) helps reduce anti-immigrant attitudes. Although we do not have all the necessary variables to test Allport's Integrated Contact Theory, we have data on both the frequency of intergroup contact (quantitative aspect) as well as the perceived quality of it. We therefore assume that:

*H1: There should be a **positive correlation** between the pro-immigrant sentiments (also towards Muslims, Jewish, and Roma immigrants) and **interpersonal contact** with people of a different race or ethnicity than that of most Hungarians. If the contact is perceived to be good, it further reduces anti-immigrant sentiments. Having any*

close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group than that of most Hungarians should obviously and positively correlate with pro-immigrant attitudes.

As far as the background variables are concerned, educational attainment seems to be the most important basic socio-demographic predictor (among age, gender, and place of residence), based on previous empirical studies. As educational attainment also generally correlates with negative anti-immigrant sentiments (Rustenbach et al (2010), for Hungarian results see: Messing and SÁgvári, 2016., Dencsó and Sik, 2007., and Sik, 2016), we might assume that respondents with higher educational levels would be less dismissive towards different immigrant groups.

H2: Out of the socio-demographic predictors educational attainment is the most important one. We expect that there is a positive correlation between levels of education and pro-immigrant attitudes.

Furthermore, interest in politics, subjective placement on the left-right scale, and party preferences may also be important predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments, based on previous empirical research evidence (for international results see Rustenbach 2010 and Hainmuller et al. 2016 and for Hungarian results see Simonovits and Szalai, 2013 and Messing-SÁgvári, 2016). As these two variables are highly interconnected with each other, we are going to use only the “so-called” left-right scale as a predictor in our analysis.

H3: Left-wing party supporters will be more likely to have welcoming attitudes towards immigrants than those of right-wing parties. Being interested in politics also increases the likelihood of being pro-immigrant.

Based on former research on ESS7 data we suppose that the perceived level of neighbourhood safety also explains views on permitting the entry of different immigrant groups (Rustenbach et al (2010)):

H4: Respondents who perceive high levels of neighbourhood safety are more likely to have welcoming attitudes towards immigrants.

Finally, we suppose that certain attitudinal variables, values, and elements of subjective

well-being might also matter in the formulation of views towards different immigrant groups. As these variables are highly interconnected with each other, we are going to reduce our analysis to *trust*, *happiness*, and *religion* as predictors in our analysis. (As we cannot formulate a clear hypothesis on that question, we treat it as an open research question). We built three logistic regression models to test our hypotheses. The definition and further explanation of the dependent variables and the predictors can be found in Appendix 1.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive results: data in focus

In this section, I focus my attention on the core variables used in the analysis. First, I present demographic composition of the sample; secondly the rate of refusal of three different immigrant groups early in the recent European migration crisis. Thirdly the main features of inter-ethnic social contacts will be described in Hungary.


Minorities in the sample

Analysing intergroup contacts and anti-immigrants sentiments it is worth taking a look at the composition of the sample in terms of various minorities: Roma were the only significant ethnic group (5.4% of the ESS7 sample reported themselves as belonging to a minority ethnic group in Hungary), which is in line with statistical data and other surveys estimating the Roma population to be 5-6% of the total Hungarian population (Kemény and Janky 2006). As far as immigrants are concerned, only 1.6% of the ESS7 sample was not born in Hungary, which is also in line with statistical data, already discussed (IOM, 2016 and Gödri 2015). Regarding religious distribution, roughly half of the sample claimed to belong to some religion or denomination: within this subsample 72.3% of the ESS7 respondents claimed to be Catholic, 24.7% said that they were Protestant, and 1.6% reported themselves as belonging to some other Christian denomination. People belonging to Judaism were extremely underrepresented in the ESS survey (only 0.1% of the respondents declared themselves to belong to one of the Jewish denominations); the explanation for that is that most Jews in Hungary do not identify as religious.

Welcoming attitudes

Figure 2 shows the distribution of welcoming attitudes in relation to Jewish, Muslim, and Roma immigrants in the order of refusal, in spring 2015. Interpreting Figure 2, it is important to bear in mind that while the arrival of Muslim immigrants was a realistic option in Hungary, the arrival of Jewish and Roma immigrants is a rather hypothetical scenario in contemporary Hungary. In the present analysis we will focus on attitudes towards Muslim immigrants, while treating Roma and Jewish immigrants as benchmarks, as both groups are indigenous minorities in Hungary that experienced different forms of negative attitudes.

Figure 2: Would you allow many, some, or few Muslims to come and live in your country? (Spring 2015) N=1698



Comparing the three different minority groups, it is clear that Muslim immigrants were less rejected than the Roma and more rejected than Jewish immigrants. It is important to bear in mind that the data collection took place in the spring of 2015, just before the huge flow of migrants began arriving at the Hungarian-Serbian border.

Inter-ethnic contacts

As far as inter-ethnic contacts are concerned, ESS7 measured these contacts in two different ways:

Quantitative aspect:

- How often do you have any contact with people who are of a different race or ethnic

group from that of most people [in the country] when you are out and about? This could be on public transport, in the street, in shops, or in the neighbourhood?

Qualitative aspect:

- Thinking about this contact, how bad or good is it in general? (0-10 scale)
- Do you have any close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group from that of most people [in the country]?

We found unexpectedly high numbers of inter-ethnic and inter-racial contact in Hungary: all together 27% of Hungarians reported having either a few (24%) or several (3%) close friends who are of a different race or ethnic group from that of most people [in the country]. Most probably they meant their Roma neighbours, and less probably their migrant acquaintances, as we found a strong correlation between the variables of the number of people belonging to minorities living in the area and having a close friends from a different ethnic group; i.e. respondents living in areas with a lot of of people belonging to different ethnic or racial minorities reported almost twice as many close friends from another minority (46%) as respondents living in settlements with almost no minority race/ethnic group present (20%). Furthermore, it is not clear how the Roma respondents understood the question on friendship. While 69% of the Roma respondents declared having a close friend of a different race or ethnic group from that of most Hungarians, this proportion was measured to be 25% in the total population. We cannot be sure, therefore, that Roma referred to (a) other Roma people as their close friends (as the question says) or (b) they thought of friends of racial or ethnic groups other than the Roma or (c) they misunderstood the question and referred to non-Roma people. The relatively high proportion of close friends “who are of a different race or ethnic group from that of most Hungarians” indicates that the interpretation of this question was diverse. As we did not want to exclude the Roma subsample from our analysis, we included ethnicity as a control variable in our regression model.

As most immigrants in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries, we decided not to exclude this tiny subsample from our analysis either.

As most of the immigrants live in Budapest (and in other big cities) we supposed that place of residence would be in close relationship with interethnic contact. However, somewhat unexpectedly, place of residence does not correlate with having any close friends of a different race or ethnic group, but it predicts to a large extent the quantity of contacts with people who are of a different race (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Quantity of contacts by place of residence (Spring 2015) N=1698



Place of residence is an important predictor in the quantity of contacts: while 40% of the respondents have regular (at least once per week) contact with people who are of a different race, this proportion is around 30% in towns and villages. On the other edge of the scale, while only one-fourth of the inhabitants of big cities have no contact with people who are of a different race, one-third of the inhabitants of towns or villages (including farmhouses) reported having zero contact. A typology was constructed based on the aforementioned two variables on the quantity and quality of contacts with people who are of a different race. The distribution of respondents across the categories of the variables is as follows:

Table 1: *Typology on type of contacts*

Type of contact	Frequency (in per cent)
1. no contact	30
2. less than once per week and bad quality contact	5
3. less than once per week and medium quality contact	24
4. less than once per week and good quality contact	8
5. at least once per week and bad quality contact	6
6. at least once per week and medium quality contact	18
7. at least once per week and good quality contact	9
Total	100

4.2 Regression models: the social basis of pro- and anti-immigrant sentiments

Here we present multivariable models measuring attitudes towards Muslim, Roma, and Jewish immigrants. The aim of constructing these models was to examine our hypotheses, controlling for other predictors included in the models. In other words, our goal was to identify the social basis of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant views in contemporary Hungary. It has to be mentioned again that these data were collected early in the Hungarian migration crisis.

As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, we built the aforementioned predictors into our model, making sure that we did not include variables which are correlated to each other to a great extent (to avoid multicollinearity). As for the explained variance of the models, we found that the predictors' overall effect on pro-immigrant sentiments is similarly strong in the case of Roma and Jewish immigrants (the adjusted R-squares are around 11%), and a bit stronger in the case of Muslim immigrants (the adjusted R-squares are around 15%). The significant relationships that emerge from the multivariable models of threats are marked with bold in Table 2 in Appendix 2.

The most important findings from the multivariable models of pro-immigrant attitudes are summarised below by immigrant groups, reflecting on the hypotheses formulated above:

Attitudes on allowing Muslim immigrants into Hungary

As far as our central hypothesis is concerned, we have argued that personal contact seems to be a very important factor in understanding interactions between a minority and a majority population. Many of the abovementioned studies have found that intergroup contact has a positive effect on negative stereotyping, and scholars draw attention to the effect that the quantity of intergroup contact has on reducing prejudice. Frequency of contact might also help de-categorize out-group members and diminish stereotypical ways of thinking. These previous findings were reinforced by our data analysis: on the one hand, having a close friend of a different race or ethnic group and the typology on the quantity and quality of contacts had a strong correspondence with attitudes towards Muslim immigrants—those who have close friends of a different racial or ethnic group are 2.5 times more likely to have pro-Muslim immigration views than those who do not have such friends. Compared to those who have no everyday life contact with people of a different race or ethnic group, all types of respondents who have regular contact with “different” people are more likely to be pro-immigrant, except

for the ones who identified the contact as bad. The highest odds ratio was found in the case of respondents who have less than once per week contact, and evaluated it as good quality. On the other hand, respondents who have frequent contact (at least once per week) and evaluate it as bad are significantly less likely to form pro-immigrant views about Muslims (odds ratio is 0.430).

Out of the four social demographic predictors included in the model, level of education and age correlated significantly with welcoming attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. The older the respondent the lower the probability of having pro-immigrant attitudes. In line with our second hypothesis, level of education has a strong positive impact on pro-immigrant attitudes—compared to those with an elementary school level of education or lower, respondents who finished high-school are 1.6 times more likely, those who finished some training after high school are 2.3 times more likely, and those who have an MA degree are 2.8 times more likely to form pro-immigrant attitudes. (Neither place of residence, nor gender, nor belonging to a minority ethnic group in Hungary correlated significantly with welcoming attitudes towards Muslim immigrants).

On the one hand—in line with the third hypothesis—left-wing party supporters are significantly more likely to have welcoming attitudes towards Muslim immigrants than right wing voters. On the other hand—contradicting to our third hypothesis— being interested in politics did not significantly increase the likelihood of being pro-immigrant. Contradicting Rustenbach's (2010) findings on neighbourhood safety in relation to pro-immigrant views, respondents who perceived higher levels of neighbourhood safety did not have significantly more welcoming attitudes towards immigrants compared to those who feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods. As far as attitude and value-related predictors are concerned, neither trust, nor religiosity, nor self-perceived happiness correlated significantly with pro-immigrant views related to Muslims.

Attitudes on allowing hypothetical Roma and Jewish immigrants into Hungary

Analysing attitudes towards hypothetical Roma and Jewish immigrants, I mostly found the same set of social-demographic factors as in the case of views on Muslim immigrants. In order to avoid needless repetition, I limit my analysis to the main specificities of the predictors of these kinds of pro-immigrant attitudes. Previous findings on the impact of intergroup contact were also confirmed by the multivariate models on hypothetical Roma and Jewish immigrants: having close friends of different racial or ethnic groups (roughly) doubles the likelihood of forming pro-immigrant views, both in case of hypothetical Jewish and Roma immigrants. Although the typology combining the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of intergroup contact worked similarly in the cases of the different immigrant groups, it should be noted that in the case of the Roma, odds ratios are not that strong, and not significant in the case of having regular contact (i.e. at least once per week) evaluated as of medium or good quality.

Regarding the four social-demographic predictors included in our models, we found certain differences when analysing the three immigrant groups. While in the case of Muslim immigrants both level of education and age correlated significantly with pro-immigrant attitudes, in the case of hypothetical Jewish immigrants we found only a correlation with level of education, and in the case of hypothetical Roma immigrants only age correlated significantly with welcoming attitudes. In other words, the older the respondents the less likely it is that they form positive attitudes towards Muslim and Roma immigrants (but this is not the case with Jewish immigrants); higher levels of education on the other hand significantly increase pro-immigrant views of both Muslim and Jewish immigrants (but not Roma). Furthermore, place of residence plays a significant role in anti-Roma sentiments. Respondents living in big cities or towns are less welcoming towards Roma immigrants than residents of villages or farmhouses.

Belonging to a minority ethnic group only increases the chances of being welcoming towards Roma immigrants, with a quite high odds ratio (2.6), implying that the category of “belonging to minority ethnic group” in the case of Hungary practically means that the respondent is Roma. The attitude and value-related predictors worked similarly with all three immigrant groups, except for trust: though the constructed index of trust (including different aspects of institutionalised trust) did not correlate significantly with pro-immigrant views related to Muslims and Jews, it played a positive role in the case of Roma immigrants.

5. Discussion

Understanding anti-immigrant sentiments in Hungary with a special focus on Islamophobia is crucial in the recent political developments. In Hungary, similarly to other countries in the region (e.g. see the outcome of the 2017 parliamentary elections in Austria), immigration and its perceived negative consequences became the primary topic of the election campaign primarily dominated by the governing right-wing party. The anti-immigrant campaign elements and the creation of symbolic threats by the immigrants proved to be effective tools for creating a moral panic in Hungary. The tendency of recent political developments (i.e. the (far-)right shift in politics) in Hungary as well as in the region is hardly separable from growing anti-immigrant sentiments. It is therefore crucial that social scientists understand the working mechanisms and the social basis of xenophobia.

Our empirical analysis reinforced the working mechanism of the contact hypothesis, as we found strong positive connection between having friends of different racial or ethnic groups and having pro-immigrant attitudes towards Muslim and Jewish, and Roma people, based on our multivariate analysis. However, the direction of the mechanism working in the background is not clear. We cannot be sure that having intergroup contact with other racial or ethnic groups *affects* individual attitudes on immigration or vice versa, as those who already have pro-immigrant views are probably more open to forming friendships with people of a different race or ethnic group. A similar dilemma might emerge in the case of everyday contacts. Does having more and positively perceived intergroup contact cause individuals to be more welcoming towards immigrants, or is it the other way around? Those with pro-immigrant views tend to recognise (instead of trying to avoid) everyday contacts with immigrants, and tend to evaluate these contacts as positive. So, although we cannot be sure about the working mechanism, our data analysis reinforced our central hypothesis on Intergroup Contact Theory. In other words, having regular and positive contact with people of different racial or ethnic groups and forming pro-immigrant attitudes towards Muslim, Jewish, and Roma people are closely and positively inter-related, when controlled for various social-demographic and attitudinal variables.

In closing I should mention the limitations of the study: as my analysis is based on an international survey—where for the sake of comparability questions are often simplistic and not perfectly adjusted to a specific country's context—two conceptual problems must be kept in mind. On the one hand the different immigrant groups named in the questionnaire were not adjusted to the specific country where the survey was implemented, and on the other hand we do not know how respondents understood the question on having close friends from different racial or ethnic groups.

When we compare the attitudes towards potential Muslim, Jewish, and Roma immigrants based on the standard questions of the European Social Survey, we are comparing attitudes towards real migrant groups with attitudes towards groups that are indigenous in Hungary, and are unlikely to show up at Hungary's borders as migrants. Hungarians, as citizens of most European countries, are mainly concerned about Muslim immigrants, and do not worry about Roma or Jewish mass migration at all. In my view the questions about hypothetical Jewish and Roma immigrants are still valid for Hungarian respondents, as both minorities are present and well-known in Hungary. However, when we interpret the results we have to be aware of the problem that it is only when we ask respondents about their attitudes towards Muslim immigrants that we present them with a *realistic* question, and that the questions about Roma and Jewish immigrants are most likely perceived as relating to purely hypothetical scenarios. On the whole, as my primary aim was to understand the working mechanism of anti-immigrant attitudes, and not to compare different levels of anti-immigrant sentiments against the various immigrant groups, I believe this difference does not harm the validity of the empirical results presented above.

A further limitation of our study is that we do not know what respondents meant by "close friendship," and probably the proportion that we found (i.e. about 1 out of 4 respondents had a few or several "close friends" of a different race or ethnicity) is a gross overestimation of the real proportion of interethnic friendships. But as our study only uses this variable as a predictor of anti-immigrant sentiments, and does not aim at measuring the exact level of interethnic friendships in Hungary, we treat this variable as a proxy for measuring *positive intergroup contact*. I therefore conclude that this conceptual uncertainty does not seriously harm the validity of the results.

Future research, in order to clarify the exact direction of the mechanisms working behind the contact hypothesis, and to better define the concept of friendship, should apply an intervention based field research. Similarly to the research completed by Kende, Tropp and Lantos (2016), a new empirical strategy may be used to test the effects of intervention based friendships between Muslim and Hungarians on anti-immigrant sentiments, by applying field experiments; this could serve as the next step towards understanding the working mechanisms of intergroup contacts in Hungary. Furthermore, conducting longitudinal panel surveys could improve our understanding of how intergroup contacts reduce prejudices and shape the levels of perceived threat or general xenophobic attitudes.

Acknowledgments

This publication has been written in the framework of a Postdoctoral Research Grant (No: 121095) supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund in Hungary.

Biographical note

Bori Simonovits holds a PhD in Sociology, and an Advanced MA in Social Policy Analysis; she is senior researcher at TÁRKI. Her major research interests include international migration, xenophobia, discrimination and attitudes. Currently she is working on her Post-Doctorate research in the framework of a Research Grant provided by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; the topic of her post-Doctorate research is as follows: "*A Meta Analysis of Intergroup Contact Theory Based on Surveys, Controlled Experiments and Case Studies With a Special Focus on Immigrants Living in Europe*". Besides her research activity she is a visiting lecturer at ELTE (Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem, Budapest), Faculty of Social Sciences in the field of discrimination, migration and labour market.

ORCID No: 0000-0002-5727-5043

Data availability statement.

As I used European Social Survey data, data can be directly downloaded from the website of ESS. See: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/country_index.html

Geolocation information. Hungary

Declaration of interest statement

In accordance with Taylor & Francis policy and my ethical obligation as a researcher, I thereby declare that I do not have any conflict of interest regarding the paper I submitted that could compromise the impartial and objective performance of my research.

References:

- Allport, Gordon W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner (2016). “How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers.” *Science*. 354 (6309): 217-222. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aag2147>
- Bernát, Anikó, Anna Kertész and F. M. Tóth (2016). “Solidarity reloaded: Volunteer and civilian organizations during the migration crisis in Hungary.” *Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological Association*. Vol. 26/4. 29-52.
http://www.szociologia.hu/dynamic/29_52_veg.pdf
- Blair, Irene. V. Bernadette Park, and Jonathan Bachelor (2003). “Understanding intergroup anxiety: Are some people more anxious than others?” *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 6(2), 151–169. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430203006002002>
- Dencső, Blanka and Endre Sik (2007). “Understanding the Levels and Causes of Prejudice in Contemporary Hungary” [Adalékok az előítéletesség mértékének és okainak megismeréséhez a mai Magyarországon]. *Educatio*. Vol 16. 50–66.
- Enyedi, Zsolt, Zoltán Fábián, and Endre Sik (2004). “Have Different kinds of Prejudices Increased in Hungary?” [Nőtték-e az előítéletek Magyarországon?]. In: *Social Report [Társadalmi riport 2004.]* Kolosi Tamás, Tóth István György, Vukovich György (eds). Budapest: TÁRKI. 375–399.
- Erős, Ferenc (2016). Summary of a public lecture by Ferenc Erős: “The Moral Panic Was Caused by the Hungarian Government and Fed by the Politics” [A morális pánikot a kormány szította, és a politika táplálja.] *Magyar Narancs* 4. November 2016.

Gang, Ira. N., Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, and Myeong-Su Yun (2002). Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes toward Foreigners in the European Union. IZA Discussion Paper Series, no. 578, Bonn, Germany.

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5ca1/f7b66c0c771318fea4a4a9f157aa1daed964.pdf>

Giczi, Johanna and Endre Sik (2009). Trust and social capital in contemporary Europe. In I. G. Tóth (Ed.), TÁRKI European Social Report 2009 Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute. 63–82.

Gödri, Irén (2015). *International migration*. In: Monostori, Judit, Péter Óri, and Zsolt Spéder (eds.): Demographic Portrait of Hungary 2015. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from

<http://demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demographicportrait/issue/view/326>

Hungarian Helsinki Committee (September 2017). Two years after: What's Left of Refugee Protection in Hungary? Information Note by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. Retrieved March 23, 2018. http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Two-years-after_2017.pdf

International Organisation for Migration (2018). Migration Issues in Hungary. www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary

Islam, Mir Rabiul and Miles Hewstone (1993). Dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup anxiety, perceived outgroup variability, and outgroup attitude: An integrative model. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19, 700–710.

doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293196005>

Attila Juhász, Bulcsú Hunyadi and Edit Zsgut (2015). Focus on Hungary: Refugees, Asylum and Migration. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2015-focus-on-hungary_refugees_asylum_migration.pdf

Kemény, István and Béla Jankó. (2006). *Roma Population of Hungary 1971-2003*. In: Kemény István (ed.) *Roma of Hungary: East European Monographs*. New York: Social Science Monographs; Atlantic Research and Publ. 170-225.

Kende, Anna, Linda Tropp, Nóra A. Lantos (2016). “Testing a contact intervention based on intergroup friendship between Roma and non-Roma Hungarians: reducing bias through institutional support in a non-supportive societal context.” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*. 47-55. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12422>

Kovács, András (2011). *The Stranger at Hand: Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary. Jewish Identities in a Changing World Series*. Leiden: Brill, 2011. ISBN 978-90-04-19194-5.

Keller, Tamás (2010). “Hungary on the world values map.” *Review of Sociology*, 20/1. 27-51.

Keller, Tamás (2013). *Values: Trust, Norms, Public Opinion on the role of the state and democracy* [In Hungarian: *Értékek. Bizalom, normakövetés, az állam szerepéről és a demokráciáról alkotott vélemények alakulása.*] Working Paper. TÁRKI, Hungarian Social Research Institute.

Kitzinger, D. (2000): “The Theory of Moral Panic” [A morális pánik elmélete]. *Replika* 40. 23-48.

Messing, Vera and Bence Ságvári (2016). “The Way We Treat Others is a Good Mirror of Ourselves” [Ahogy »másokhoz« viszonyulunk, az tükrözi azt, amilyenek magunk vagyunk”. *A magyarországi idegenellenesség okairól*]. In *Kisebbség, többség, többszörösség* (eds. Takács, Judit – P. Tamás Tóth) Budapest, MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont.

Messing, Vera and Bence Ságvári (2018). *Looking Behind the Culture of Fear. Cross-national analysis of attitudes towards migration*.

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/14181.pdf>

Paolini, Stefania, Miles Hewstone, Ed Cairns, and Alberto Voci (2004). “Effects of direct and indirect cross-group friendships on judgments of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland: The mediating role of an anxiety reduction mechanism.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 770–786. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203262848>

Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Linda R. Tropp (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), pp. 751-783. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751>.

Róna-Tas, Ákos (2015.: Interview with Róna-Tas, Ákos titled as “The Current Moral Panic is Much More Dangerous than a Mosque in Zugló or an Imam in the Parliament” [Ez a morális pánik sokkal veszélyesebb, mint egy mecset Zuglóban, vagy egy imám a Parlamentben]. 444.hu. 2 October 2015. <http://444.hu/2015/10/02/ez-a-moralis-panik-sokkal-veszelyesebb-mint-egy-mecset-zugloban-vagy-egy-imam-a-parlamentben/>

Rustenbach, Elisa (2010). “Sources of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.” *International Migration Review*. Volume 44/1: 53-77.

Simonovits (forthcoming): The Public Perception of the Migration Crisis from the Hungarian Point of View—Evidence from the Field. Submitted to IMISCOE Book Series titled as geographies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities

Simonovits, B. (2016): Realistic and Symbolic Threats. The Social Basis of Mass-Migration Related Fear in Contemporary Hungary. *Review of Sociology*. 2016/4. Vol. 4. pp. 53-74.

Simonovits, Bori Anikó Bernát, Blanka Szeitl, Endre Sik, Daniella Boda, Anna Kertész, Fruzsina M. Tóth, and Judit Barta (2016). In *The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary*. Edited by: Simonovits, B. and Bernát, A. Budapest TÁRKI. 155. http://old.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf

Simonovits, Bori and Boglárka Szalai (2013). Xenophobia and Discrimination in Contemporary Hungary [Idegenellenesség és diszkrimináció a mai Magyarországon.] Hungarian Science [Magyar Tudomány]. Budapest. 251-262.
<http://www.matud.iif.hu/2013/03/03.htm>.

Simonovits, B. and Szalai B. (2012). Simonovits, B., Szalai, B. (2012): The Relationship Between Social Contacts and Social Distance [A személyes ismerős léte és a társadalmi távolság kapcsolata.] In Migráns esélyek és tapasztalatok. Edited by Endre Sik, and Bori Simonovits: Budapest: (2012) TÁRKI, 44-67.

Stephan, Walter G. and Cookie White Stephan (1985). “Intergroup anxiety”. Journal of Social Issues, 41, 157–175. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1985.tb01134.x>

Stephan, Walter G., Kurt A. Boniecki, Oscar Ybarra, Ann Bettencourt, Kelly S. Ervin, Linda A. Jackson, Penny S. McNatt, and C. Lausanne Renfro (2002). The role of threats in the racial attitudes of Blacks and Whites. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1242–1254.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672022812009>

Velasco—Gonzalez, Karina, Verkuyten, Maykel and Weesie, Jeroen and Poppe, Edwin (2008). “Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory.” British Journal of Social Psychology 2008(47). 667-685.
<https://doi.org/10.1348/014466608X284443>

Appendix 1: Variables of the logistic regression models

Dependent variable: Allowing Jewish, Muslim, Roma immigrants on a four-degree-scale (D26-28) recoded into a binary variable, where 0 stands for “none of this group should be let in” and 1 is for “some of them should be let in”:

Predictors:

Main predictors:

- **Inter-ethnic contacts:** in terms of quantity and quality:
 - *Typology on type of contacts (see specification in Table 1)*
 - *Having close friend*
- **Level of education** (elementary school at most), trade school, high school, training for high school graduates, BA or BSc, MA or MSc
- **Perceived safety in the area (C6):** Feeling of safety when walking alone in the area after dark: 1 Very safe, 2 Safe, 3 Unsafe, (4 Very unsafe)
- **Political affiliation and interest:**
 - Left-right scale (B19): 0 (left) to 10 (right) (continuous variable) LRSCALE
 - How interested in politics POLINTR: 1 Very interested, 2 Quite interested, 3 Hardly interested, (4 Not at all interested)

Values, attitudes, subjective well-being:

Subjective well-being will be simply measured through happiness

- **Happiness**¹: 1 (extremely unhappy) to 10 (extremely happy) (continuous variable)
- **Religion:** How religious you are? 0 Not at all religious 10 Very religious (continuous variable)
- **Trust (B2 to B6)**²: 0 No trust at all to 10 Complete trust (continuous variable), based on the following five items, all together 0 to 50 points can be achieved:
 - Trust in the country’s Parliament
 - Trust in the legal system

¹ Originally this variable was measured on a 0 to 10 scale, but due to the low number of cases, the values of 0 and 1 was recoded into 1.

² Trust in the European Parliament and trust in the United Nations both have been left out from the analysis, due to the high number of “do not know” answers.

- Trust in the police
- Trust in politicians
- Trust in political parties

Control variables: in brackets reference categories for the categorical variables

- **Gender:** male (female)
- **Age:** measured in years (continuous variable)
- **Domicile:** Big city, town (country village or farmhouse)
- **Ethnicity:** Belonging to majority ethnic group in country (Belonging to minority ethnic group in country)

Appendix 2: Tables

Table 1: typology on type of contacts (N=1631)

Type of contact	Frequency (in per cent)
1. no contact	30
2. less than once per week and bad quality contact	5
3. less than once per week and medium quality contact	24
4. less than once per week and good quality contact	8
5. at least once per week and bad quality contact	6
6. at least once per week and medium quality contact	18
7. at least once per week and good quality contact	9
Total	100

Source: ESS7 Hungarian data, own calculation

Table 2 Multivariable models of allowing Muslim, Roma, and Jewish immigrants into Hungary: Logistic regression models


	(1-some of them, 0-non of them)		(1-some of them, 0-non of them)		(1-some of them, 0-non of them)	
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	N=1221	Adjusted R Square=15.2%	N=1246	Adjusted R Square=10.6%	N=1212	Adjusted R Square=11.1%
	Sig. (Wald test)	odds ratio (Exp (B))	Sig. (Wald test)	odds ratio (Exp (B))	Sig. (Wald test)	odds ratio (Exp (B))
Gender (female)	0,88	1,021	0,103	1,252	0,436	0,895
Age	0,046*	0,992	0,001**	0,987	0,874	0,999
Level of education (elementary school at most)	0,001**		0,207		0,004**	
trade school	0,699	1,08	0,672	0,919	0,177	1,302
high school	0,0130*	1,656	0,985	0,996	0,113	1,377
training for high school graduates	0,004***	2,366	0,834	1,066	0,001**	3,259
BA or BSc	0,068	1,603	0,124	1,479	0,018*	1,896
MA or MSc	0,002**	2,813	0,113	1,637	0,005**	2,891
Domicile (country village or farmhouse)	0,17		0,026*		0,224	
Big city	0,452	0,875	0,010*	0,627	0,984	1,004
Town	0,062	0,747	0,045*	0,732	0,14	0,79
Belonging to minority ethnic group in country (no)	0,807	0,927	0,002**	2,61	0,525	1,239
Having close friend of different race or ethnic group of most of the country (no)	0,000***	2,5	0,000***	1,94	0,000***	2,258
Quantity and quality of contacts (no contact)	0,000***		0,002**		0,000***	
less than once per week and bad quality contact	0,993	0,997	0,342	0,729	0,805	0,929
less than once per week and medium quality contact	0,000***	2,498	0,029*	1,465	0,000***	2,033
less than once per week and good quality contact	0,000***	3,754	0,076	1,553	0,032	1,811

at least once per week and bad quality contact	0,013	0,43	0,007**	0,357	0,001**	0,405
at least once per week and medium quality contact	0,006*	1,71	0,395	1,182	0,148	1,335
at least once per week and good quality contact	0,001***	2,346	0,167	1,412	0,046*	1,755
Happiness (1-10)	0,369	1,019	0,729	0,993	0,475	1,018
Neighbourhood safety (very unsafe)	0,702		0,343		0,14	
Very safe	0,436	1,351	0,593	1,244	0,074	1,965
Safe	0,428	1,299	0,25	1,498	0,024	2,015
Unsafe	0,742	1,121	0,662	1,174	0,1	1,713
Interested in politics (Not at all interested)	0,795		0,822		0,33	
Very interested	0,847	0,936	0,545	1,229	0,613	0,838
Quite interested	0,334	0,832	0,667	0,921	0,613	1,102
Hardly interested	0,771	0,955	0,7	0,939	0,121	1,289
left-right scale (0 left, 10 right)	0,000***	0,896	0,000***	0,884	0,000***	0,897
religious (0 not at all, 10 very religious)	0,127	1,038	0,965	0,999	0,018	1,061
TRUST (0 to 50)	0,623	1,003	0,000***	1,03	0,053	1,014
Constant	0,183	0,533	0,388	0,659	0,137	0,495

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figures:

Figure 1: The ratio of xenophobes, xenophiles and thinkers, 1992-2017 (in per cent)



Source of data: Tárki Omnibus survey, 1992-2017.

Figure 2: Would you allow many, some, or few Muslims to come and live in your country? (Spring 2015) N=1698





Figure 3: Quantity of contacts³ with people who are of a different race (N=1656, Hungary, spring 2015)



List of figures:

Figure 1: The ratio of xenophobes, xenophiles and thinkers, 1992-2017 (in per cent)

Figure 2: Would you allow many, some, or few Muslims to come and live in your country? (Spring 2015) N=1698

Figure 3: Quantity of contacts⁴ with people who are of a different race (N=1656, Hungary, spring 2015)

³ Quantity of contacts was originally measured in seven categories (1. Never, 2. Less than once a month, 3. Once a month, 4. Several times a month, 5. Once a week, 6. Several times a week, 7. Every day), but due to the low number of cases in certain categories I recoded this variable into three categories: 1. Never 2. Less than once a week, 3. At least once a week

⁴ Quantity of contacts was originally measured in seven categories (1. Never, 2. Less than once a month, 3. Once a month, 4. Several times a month, 5. Once a week, 6. Several times a week, 7. Every day), but due to the low number of cases in certain categories I recoded this variable into three categories: 1. Never 2. Less than once a week, 3. At least once a week